For Wednesday, 3/31 -- FEAR AND TREMBLING, "PREAMBLE FROM THE HEART"

Address one of the following Questions:

--What is Silentio's view of ORPHEUS? How can you read it in light of the hero/poet distinction in the "Praise"? Why does he consider it a good illustration of what "work" is?

--Discuss the relationship between philosophy and faith. What is the "monstrous paradox" of Abraham's life?

--Silentio compares ["the dialectic of"] faith to a ["double"] movement. What a kind of a movement is it? How does it work?

--Comment on the relation between finitude and infinitude in S's account of Abraham. What is "infinite resignation"?

--Why does Silentio use the metaphor of knights? How does it help him to explain what he means by faith?

--Discuss one particular example of a story or verbal illustration Silentio uses to explain the central paradox of faith.

[Oh, and -- on that last subject -- why do you think he's so into this story of the Lad and the Princess?]

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Knights: A complaint, some confusion, and maybe one line worth of basic analysis at the end…err, maybe just more confusion

Jack

Well

I think Søren (what is that thing on the “o”?) first introduces the knight thing near the end of 67: “The knights of infinite resignation are readily recognizable, their gait is gliding, bold. But those who wear the jewel of faith can easily disappoint…they look like bourgeois philistines.” My immediate reaction to this opening description of the knight of infinite resignation, along with some nearby lines about them being scornful, etc. was that knight = crusader = self-righteous, primarily. I do think a few specific things about the language here might get in the way: is “wearing a jewel” really some king of obvious euphemism for knighthood for those who’ve read more knight stories? That would make my initial impression of contrast between knightly resignation and bourgeois faith much less. Is “gait is gliding” right after “…resignation are readily recognizable” some attempt of our translator to convey some alliteration in the original? The asyndeton of “gliding, bold” is probably in the original, but what does it mean? Is this sincerely poetic? Ironically poetic? Clearly jingly-jangling/mock epic/belittling? I can’t tell.

As it turns out, the knights of infinite resignation are not bad guys. Kierkegaard seems to basically be one himself. As explained in the Lad and the Princess, the knight of faith would act identically to the knight of resignation, except that he would have faith that his love would be fulfilled, despite the impossible to their gulf in social standing. I don’t really get this—how would this love be fulfilled? God apparently would never actually have let Abe kill Isaac, but I don’t think the princess’ padre is going to be so accommodating. Please explain the limits of the princess story analogy to me.

“If a person lacks this concentration, this focus, his soul is disintegrated from the start, and then he will never come to make the movement, he will act prudently in life like those capitalists who invest their capital in every kind of security so as to gain on the one what they lose on the other--in short, he is not a knight” (72). A pretty direct statement of what Kierkegaard thinks of as knighthood: non-prudence. The knight of resignation makes a little non-prudent leap, but still rests secure in the knowledge of his own self. The leap of faith is the biggest possible such leap; Kierkegaard is incapable of it; you have to have faith in the absurd. But how is this consistent with the bourgeois merchant? Knights are hyper-aware of their imprudence, they pride themselves on their imprudence; the bourgeois is unaware of any imprudence in his actions.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Sara Sol

(3-The dialectic of faith as a double movement)

S’s faith is a “double movement”- for to truly have faith you first have to resign all hope and fear in the knowledge that the terrible will occur and must occur and cannot not occur. S grants that this first half of the double movement is possible, even plausible to happen in him. But the second half is in such contradiction with the first that he simply cannot comprehend its existence in reality. This second movement is the exact retracing of the first, it brings you precisely back to the joy and confidence of the moment before the horrible one, returning what had been resigned. The contradiction in this double movement dumbfounds his ability to replicate it in himself, but does not dumbfound his ability to describe it – he is the poet able to describe, but the not the hero who can do. In the first movement the temporal finiteness expelled, and with it everything of importance to him, for it is a resignation to the sorrow of loss BUT it requires the knowledge that “the deep secret that even in loving another one should be sufficient unto oneself”. The resignation allows for a detachment from the temporal and provides an eternity of contemplating love. But the second movement reattaches the lover to the loved, and allows for the true existence in the restored temporal finite.

     “The moment the Knight resigned he was convinced of the impossibility of, humanely speaking... In an infinite sense however, it was possible, through renouncing it [as a finite possibility].” S states that this resignation of hope in the finite preserves what was hoped for in the infinite sense. This allows him to return to the finite immediately in the second movement, in which he regains what he’s lost and feels no pain in having lost it. One of the most important distinctions Silentio is between the temporal and the infinite. S uses the word movement to describe the dialectic of faith. Movement implies change- the change something goes through when it goes one place to another. So, faith requires change, and is not produced is stagnancy- and this change is reflected in the finite. The knight of faith has an immediate existence in the temporal in which is movements are continuous- this is essential to faith. Even when he has resigned the temporal, he can return to it without hesitation.  S compares this to the movement of the dancer, who shows more skill in being able to leap and land perfectly with no moment in between of imbalance or insecurity. This strict adherence to the progression of time marks the man of faith from the rest- not only does he complete the double movement but he does it without faltering, progressing without a moment of hesitation.  

Mazzin 

Thank Goodness for Wikipedia.

Kierkegaard makes the distinction between the "knight of faith" and the "knight of infinite resignation" Sara pretty much covered this already but too bad I will do it again.(hmm maybe I should just paste mine above Sara's and everyone will think she copied me) anyway, A knight of infinite resignation is something that Kierkegaard believes he can become but a knight of faith he will never be. The "infinite resignation" is a person who gives up hope in everything they love in this world, they continually mourn the loss of whatever, in the story it is exemplified by the princess and lover analogy. The "knight of "infinite resignation" will mourn the fact that he will not be with the princess in this world but believes that he will be with the princess infinitely in the afterlife.  The "knight of faith" does not make any sense to me as it sort of did for Kierkegaard as well. This knight will give up all hope in being with the princess in this world but at the same time will trust that he will be with her. Faith is based on "the strength of the absurd".  The idea of faith is contradictory and seems that any rational intelligent person would not have faith; how could you believe in something thats contradictory in nature? But I guess that is why Kierkegaard has so much respect for Abraham.  This is stated on pg. 65 "...he believed that God would not demand Isaac of him, while he was willing to offer him tif that was indeed what was demanded. He believed on the strength of the absurd..." On the next page there is a section that confuses me "For that is not what he did as I can prove by the fact that he received Isaac back with joy, really heartfelt joy, that he needed no preparation, no time to adjust himself to finitude and its joy.... for he who loves god without faith reflects on himself, for he who loves god in faith reflects on god" Is this saying that one who has faith would never question ones personal actions but would instead "reflect" or question the actions of god?

Karena

Kierkegaard begins his primary discussion of philosophy as it relates to faith by conceding the difficulty of philosophy.  He notes a difference between a work of philosophy and that which includes faith when he admits that while he could finally understand Hegelian philosophy, the faith involved in the story of Abraham leaves Kierkegaard “virtually annihilated” (Kierkegaard, 62).  For Kierkegaard, the element of faith in the story of Abraham lifts his interest and confusion to a whole new level (admitting on the bottom of page 66, “Abraham I cannot understand; in a way all I can learn from him is to be amazed”).

It is at this point that Kierkegaard addresses the “monstrous paradox” of Abraham’s life.  While Kierkegaard tries to feel for Abraham’s shoes, he finds himself stumped at the thought of what repletes his own condition with power superior to that of Abraham.  He initially claims he would commit the reverent deed even “too early instead, so as to have done with it quickly” (Kierkegaard, 64).  In his imagination, Kierkegaard would certainly do better than Abraham.  The “monstrous paradox” that leaves him “virtually annihilated” follows in his thought.  “‘Now everything is lost, God demands Isaac, I sacrifice him, and with him all my joy - yet God is love and for me continues to be so’” (Kierkegaard, 64).  How could it be that the very deed that rids Abraham of his joy is at the same moment the ticket to it?  

Originally, Kierkegaard thinks that a sign of Abraham’s hesitation to commit the deed is what would keep Abraham from absolute praise in the religious expression as it opposes the ethical.  Boarding the mission early, for example, was one of the ways that Kierkegaard would do it better.  At this point, however, Kierkegaard is already at war with himself as he imagines Abraham to have been.  He explores the issue whilst calling it a “monstrous paradox,” and he has also already admitted earlier that there were conflicting ways of viewing Abraham’s deed.  “The ethical expression for what Abraham did is that he was willing to murder Isaac; the religious expression is that he was willing to sacrifice Isaac” [my emphasis] (Kierkegaard, 60).  Even with regard to just the religious expression, Kierkegaard recognizes the contradiction that Abraham’s deed is both a means of losing and gaining joy (as I’ve previously noted).  The faith is what “makes it hard” (Kierkegaard, 60).

For Kierkegaard, philosophy as he knows it is likely to impose a constraint on faith.  It is for this reason that he reassigns philosophy to, “understand itself and know just what it has indeed to offer, without taking anything away, least of all cheating people out of something by making them think it is nothing” (Kierkegaard, 63).  To remove faith would be to ignore the story entirely and address the issue inadequately.  Philosophy’s attempt to slight faith would be an utter disavowal that Kierkegaard rejects on account of the complication that it brings to bear on the story -- for that is precisely what keeps him amazed.  Faith may necessitate embracing the absurd, but faith for Kierkegaard is much more important than philosophy might make it out to be.

Michael - "SK is a tool", or "how my spite was reborn".

Errrrr, did our friend SK have some kind of traumatic experience with underperforming in recorder class relative to some girl upon whom he had previously had a crush in the 3rd grade? Orpheus is a lyre-player, not a man? Orpheus was tender-hearted, not brave? And he was deluded for being these... would then women (in their proper place in European society) always be deluded by God, for not being men? Or are they supposed to not be men, and are they supposed to be tender-hearted? A courageous woman surely sins against her faith and will therefore be deluded by God—what? And since when are courage and tender-heartedness antithetical?

SK, bro, you're way out there.

I like the attack on philosophy under the guise of "conventional wisdom" at the top of page 58. Socrates would have something to say to SK here: "duuuude, we don't need bread, we're all suicidal... those of us who know large truths, leastaways." To which SK might say, "suicide is sin!!!!!!!!!!!" And then everyone who doesn't share his mindless conviction will shake their heads sadly and leave the good Dane sitting in a corner, frothing at the mouth.

Building off SK's train of thought with Abraham being willing to give up his best to God, I'm not sure Isaac is really his "best." If anything, his "best" is his faith in God. Of course, it's a faith he's deluded himself into after setting his God up above all the other gods in the region—anyone heard this story? It's pretty funny.

Abraham's father was an idol-maker; he built idols to be worshipped by the people of the land. One day he left his shop under Abe's supervision. When he returned, all the idols had been destroyed but one. Furious with his son, he cried "what happened here?!" And Abe steadfastly replied, "father, the strongest god killed the weaker ones."

Cool story, right?

I think SK is assuming too much when he says that "to a son, the father has the highest and most sacred duty." Yeah. I'm sure SK is very knowledgeable about the cultural norms in Abraham's world. He's really out on a limb there, especially since he's drawing upon the morals of post-Moses society—several thousand years down the line at this point. As Rousseau would have us believe, the savage man has no regard for familial ties. Abraham is not a Savage, but he's a lot closer to nature than SK is, and there's no apparent reason to believe that one of society's morals should develop in every civilization.

SK is a literature snob, too, it would seem. He likes his content mundane and down-to-earth, resonating with the people like stories of priests and biblical interpretation. I dunno, man. The Bible was probably the best literature I've ever read. I don't know why SK would settle for worse!

I find it deeply ironic—deeply, disturbingly, distressingly ironic—that he declaims against the man who doesn't have the "courage" to "think" (p. 60). 

I think it's important to note at some point that Isaac's value at this point (before he becomes a patriarch himself) is entirely in his primogeniture. He's not an interesting character. He's not a valuable person. He has done nothing to brighten Abraham's days. He sits around not knowing things, asking questions here and there—and not the trollish questions of that asshole King David, but questions wrought from true ignorance—and generally being an object. (Might I add, an object overly fetishized in much of the visual art surrounding his sacrifice.) I don't feel Abe's love for his son—I don't feel any love for the idiot child. How old is Isaac supposed to be? "Father, but where is the burnt offering?" I have no sympathy for him. And neither does Abraham. Isaac sitting bound on the rock could easily sing Dylan's "One More Cup of Coffee":

"But I don't sense affection / 

No gratitude or love /

Your loyalty is not to me /

But to the stars above"

That's Abraham, whether he is truly loyal to God or whether he is just blind with greed (likely, if he actually cares about Isaac; unlikely, given his bargaining for those poor innocent states of Sodom&Gomorrah).

I'ma say "over" now because though I have yet to truly respond to any of the prompts I have gone on long enough. Michael (and all his spite) over & out.

Chris

One of the most intriguing portions of the text occurs when Silento speaks of the man considering the meal his wife “will surely” have prepared for him.  In spite of the man’s lack of money, “he firmly believes his wife has that delicacy waiting for him” (69).  Silento suggests that he believes this to the extent he would discuss the meal with a stranger with “a passion befitting a restaurateur.”  Conceptually, it would seem this “knight of the infinite” has a consciousness that functions with an ever-present understanding of multiple threads.  He truly believes his wife has prepared this meal for him, but at the same time, if she doesn’t have the meal prepared “he is exactly the same.”  It would seem that the knight’s ability to move seamlessly from the train of thought that the meal is there, to the one in which it is not marks the extent to which he is aware of the possible outcomes, while “firmly believing” the dish is there.  I suppose the movement of faith functions along similar parameters, but I am unconvinced that, in this example, it is any different than shear ignorance. 

On a side note, Michael’s spite is quite appropriate.  The machismo rhetoric is incredibly tiresome. 

Anyways, back to the knight metaphor.  The way I understood it was the association between a journey and the fact that faith is a “movement.”  It would seem it works in an attempt to take away the “thing-ness” of faith and imply that it is a process.  Like we’ve discussed countless times, because faith is a movement, it would almost have to be temporal (although the way Silento discusses it, it would seem that knights’ understanding of faith would border on an almost simultaneous experience of faith and time).  Anyways, Sara’s summation of the “double-movement” is pretty much the way I understood faith working.  Unfortunately, Silento’s getting caught up on “joy” is just baffling to me.   His argument about Abraham’s joy upon receiving Isaac and Abe’s not requiring “preparation” is entirely unconvincing to me.