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Week 4 - Boethius Books 1-3

Page history last edited by Jack Gedney 14 years, 1 month ago

**The assignment for BOOK I is to write two paragraphs on the relationship between a specific element of the poems that begin each chapter and the prose content of the chapters. You may post below. If you choose to EDIT the page as an administrator, be sure to include your NAME at the beginning of your posting.

 

**The assignment for BOOKS II-III is to write two paragraphs on the body/soul distinction as it relates to the rhetoric of the first 3 books of "THE CONSOLATION."

 

--D

 

FROM DW, 2/16/10. HERE ARE SOME BRIEF NOTES AND QUESTIONS ON BOOKS II AND III:

BOOK II

We have an open invitation in Book II to compare Lady Philosophy -- who nurtured B with her own milk -- and Fortune, who is also figured as a woman. Fortune claims to have "adopted" B (Oxford, 21), so she too is a mother -- though not a natural one. How do these two mothers function in B's life? Can you see the body/soul division in the separate influences of these two individuals? Do they ever cross paths? Do you seen the two as rivals? Or do their roles have some conjunction?

We should note that we have Lady Philosophy impersonating Fortune, giving us direct speech. What does this accomplish rhetorically? (By the way, I agree with Ana's quote below that Book I is somewhat of a "pity party." Could this be a setup? Is it a coincidence that a long discussion of Fortune's ways follows B's "self-indulgent" and "neurotic" rant (in the the words of Lady Philosophy)?

Fortune seems to be allied with the changing world. Can B do without her? Is it he who, in some sense, misinterprets her role in his life? If so, then how?

What is Fortune's role in LP's refutation of Possessions (Ch. 5), Status (Ch. 6), Fame (Ch. 7)? How are we left to think about her at the end of Book II?

 

BOOK III

Analyze the transition between Book II and Book III. What has changed? How is the frame acting? What is B's attitude like now?

What do you think of LP's definition of happiness? Can you think of an alternate definition? What is she setting up by defining it in this way? The idea that men always "seek what is good" is a central tenet of Socratic philosophy. Wickedness is just a misdirected quest for good. What does this do to the concept of evil in the world? How does this play out in Book III?

What does the poem at the end of Chapter 2 demonstrate? How does it lead into Chapter 3?

Chapter 3 introduces the notion -- which carries through to the end of the chapter -- that "earth-bound creatures" seek their beginning. This alignment of happiness with the seeking for a "home" or an "origin" is also a Socratic idea. What do you think B means? Do you agree? What role does desire play in the quest for home? Does it help or hurt?

Of the various erroneous ways people look for happiness, which ones do you think B. is most guilty of?

Chapter 9 marks the end of the critique of false happiness and a venture into positive statements about "true happiness." Can you identify some of the principles LP and B introduce in order to conduct their discussion? For example, on pg. 53, we have a statement (which we are being asked to accept!) about the "simple" and "undivided" in nature.

How does human perception affect our view of the world? of reality? Where, for B, does human error play a part in the ordering (or disordering) of the world?

What ideas about the soul come through in the hymn at the end of Ch. 9? Do you recognize principles from Plato? the Presocratics? Come up with some specific examples. How do soul, mind and body seem to relate? What seems to be the interrelationship between the Universe, Nature, and Man?

[Notes on Ch's 10, 11, 12 to come LATER!]

 

 

 

Jack: The main subject of the opening poem is Boethius’ relation to the Muses. Formerly, they aided him in writing zesty, youthful poems; now, they supposedly console him as he writes of his sorrows. Boethius interprets his outflowing feelings as evidence that the Muses have not abandoned him, and that they attend him, unlike Death and Fortune who are “cruel” or “treacherous.” I expect that “why did you harp” is a locution of our translator, but I also think he probably had good reason to suggest a parallel between the inaccurate praise of his friends and the influence of the Muses (it is also possible that “my friends” is actually speaking literally to the Muses, I don’t know, I don’t really trust rhymed translations). Anyways, major points are Boethius’ insistence on the authenticity of his feelings (“unfeigned” tears) and the shared role the Muses play in his pain (“blood-stained” and experiencing “dread”). The inherent implication of “unfeigned” is that the Muses have been known to elicit false tears in the past; the emphasis on the shared nature of the suffering suggests a self-interest on the Muses’ part; there is really no reason to think that the Muses are suffering, this kind of thing is just part of their job description, really.

            Philosophy shows up and more than confirms all of these hints that the Muses are not to be trusted. In the poem, the idea was suggested precisely by showing Boethius’ misplaced confidence in them; it was the pitiful sight of a man who trusts someone who is misleading him. In Philosophy's first speech, she kicks them out, labeling them “harlots,” bringers of “poison,” and “Sirens.” Their behavior is pretty pathetic, they look at the ground, blush, and depart while Philosophy’s eyes “flash fire”. Boethius’ eyes are blinded with tears. This translation of spiritual condition/influence into descriptions of physical ocular behavior is in itself poetic: Philosophy, as she will soon demonstrate, is not without poetic ability, but her poetry is far stronger, firmer, brighter, more piercing, without white hairs, wrinkles, and old age, like fire rather than tears, like lightning rather than the “clouded” gaze the petty opening Boethius pins on Fortune. Philosophy possesses her own kind of poetry, and she doesn't need any Muses to put the honey on the cup. There is a contrast in tone between the opening poem and the opening prose section, but it is a contrast in genre deeper than the mere presence of meter. The opening poem is typically elegiac, Boethius' helplessness is reminiscent of helpless Romans, Ovid comes to mind, and possibly Cicero (did he write poetry when exiled? he definitely whined, anyways). Philosophy's prose seems crisp, focused, but still poetic; it presents an alternate model of poetry. (This is all a description of the relationship between the first poem, only, and the following prose.) 

 

     Jack (2-17): (I guess everyone else actually likes character limits and the inability to italicize.) Boethius, as a proud follower of Philosophy, is of course well up to date with the Platonic (and apparently Aristotelian) arguments for the immortality of the soul (28). As such, he readily accepts all of Philosophy's dismissals of the more transient and ephemeral "goods." Some, such as bodily pleasures, are self-evidently finite due to their very direct dependence on the body. Others, such as fame or recognition of high political office, are dependent on, for example, geographical limits, a distinction which inevitably accompanies the body, while not, I assume, the soul (The Great Ethereal Beyond is supranational). An assumed acceptance of some form of body/soul dichotomy thus seems to underly much of the process of dismissing all of the false goods which men chase after. I think one important question, as Davey posed above, is which false path is Boethius following?

     The lowest (most easily scorned) path is simple bodily pleasure, which certainly does not seem to be Boethius' life mission. The subject of most of his book 1 complaints was the lack of recognition for his virtuous conduct. Associated with this was the loss of his office (and, just incidentally in his actual expressed complaints, the loss of his life), the poor reputation he would have after his death (the public believes the most reason news as reported via the official channels), and the sudden loss of actual power to influence the larger political scene. These seem subject to Philosophy's critiques, but is the hope for recognition (by Fortune (who appears to be dependent on  humans for realization of her caprices)) really synonymous with the pursuit of glory and fame or any of Philosophy's other bodily-limited false goods? If, as also suggested above, Philosophy and Fortune exist as comparable deity-like figures, why is the pursuit of Philosophy's approval any more justifiable than the pursuit of Fortune's? Is this a personality contest? (Of course not)

     In brief, Boethius' claim was that he wanted just treatment, commensurate with the virtue of his soul, expressed through his noble actions, unmotivated by petty bodily concerns. Philosophy's response is to launch on a series of critiques of body-based (meaning, essentially, finite) goods. Is this an appropriate response? Or does she dismiss hastily Boethius' claims to philosophical understanding of the body/soul distinction? Unfortunately for Boethius' dignity, I feel that Philosophy saw through his righteous smokescreens to his real concerns (all of the supposedly incidental bad things which happened to him were really what prompted his obviously futile claims for equity from the by-definition inequitable Fortune). 

Comments (20)

jenneke_olson@berkeley.edu said

at 12:58 pm on Feb 11, 2010

Most of the poem of chapter one was spent alluding to the poet’s age and despair. Most of the prose of chapter one was spent describing the lady who positioned herself above his head. I felt that he was looking at her from a cloud of depression and as a result saw only beauty. He refers to his own age in line eight by calling it ‘sad’ and ‘old’ but when referring to her age he describes “she was so advanced in years”. The comparison being that with him, age is a hindrance, something holding him back, but with her, age was something that gave her an edge, an advancement in time.
One other thing I noticed was the ladder painting on the lady’s dress. “At the lower edge of the robe was visible in embroidery the letter II, and the neck of the garment bore the letter O; between them could be seen the depiction of a ladder, whose rungs allowed ascent from the lower letter to the higher.” The first thing that struck me about this passage is that only an ascent was mentioned in term of the ladder itself, there was no thought to whether someone would look at it as a descending ladder. It seemed to me to be a reflection of the lady herself, someone would could only bring you up not down. The other thing I noticed about this passage was how it related to the last line of the poem: “My steps were insecure; I tumbled down.” It produced in me an imagery of someone climbing steps, or perhaps that ladder, and then felt that sensation of missing a step or thinking one is there when it isn’t, and that unbalance creates a conflict with gravity. When I read the passage about the lady’s ‘ladder’, I couldn’t help but relate the two.

Mazzin said

at 12:59 am on Feb 12, 2010

In my initial reading of the text it became apparent that the lady, which has “come down gliding down from the pole of heaven” is Boethius’s inner thoughts. He seems to be rationalizing and contemplating with himself. The lady is his inner voice, which speaks the teachings of his acquired philosophy. The poem, which starts off in chapter three, directly correlates to the text that follows. “ Then darkness left me. Dispelled was the night; vitality of old renewed my sight.” Compare this line to the first line in the text. “ In just this way the clouds of melancholy were dispelled. I drank in the clear air of heaven; recovery of my wits had enabled me to identify my healer’s face.” This line in the text could very well replace the line in the poem; they are both stating the same thing. Being shackled in chains Boethius forgot the virtues of his philosophical teachings. Once he has the revelation of remembering these teachings he is no longer sad and dismal, it becomes clear why he has chosen this path.
The poem goes on to expand the idea of uncertainty in fate, and then the later realization of hope. “ Foul weathers gather…the sun lurks hidden, night enshrouds the earth…then from the Thracian cave the north wind’s flight assaults the darkness, frees the imprisoned light…presents his orb to our astonished gaze” Boethius is simply using the earth and light/darkness as a metaphor for his mind’s thoughts. The initial shock of being betrayed by his community for doing good has clouded his mind in darkness, once he has time to reflect, his thoughts become clear and hopeful.

Sara Sol said

at 1:03 am on Feb 12, 2010

In chapter 3 Philosophy(as a personification) says “it is no occasion for surprise if on the ocean of life we are buffeted by storms which whistle about our ears, for our chief aim is to displease the wicked”(pg7) , she uses the storm as a description of the bad things which have befallen philosophers (Socrates, Anaxagoras, Zeno) this storm metaphor appears quite a few times in both the narrative/philosophical portions and the poetic portions. This particular use follows a long metaphor, in verse, of the storm that blinds Boethius , and his sudden salvation from its sickness by philosophy “the north wind’s flight/assaults the darkness, and frees the light”(6) . At first I thought it odd that these two uses of the storm should be so different- one describing the difficulties brought on by being a follower of philosophy, and the other describing the blindness of being in the storm of human emotions and not following philosophy.
But I think the repetition forms a connection between these two storms- somehow the storm he is caught and imprisoned by is only a storm because he subsequently abandoned philosophy. I am not articulating this very well, because it’s not a very complex idea and I managed to make it sound like one, all I am saying is that Philosophy is likening his(B’s) blindness to the pain he feels because of his human punishments, with the use of the storm metaphors, and that the pain of both storms can be avoided if Boethius remembers his non-mortal soul that will not suffer if he un-blinds himself. The storms are intrinsically connected- if he escapes the storm of disbelief he will escape the storm of pain because he will not be attached to the body.
I couldn’t help but see Socrates’ myth everywhere in the verse, this ocean of life seems so much like the ocean on earth that Socrates says is foggy and blinding us from the true surface of the earth.

Stacy said

at 9:07 am on Feb 12, 2010

Book I was about the lament and despair of Boethius at having been charged with a crime he did not commit. In Chapter 1 we see that he wallows in his own self pity. He blames fate for his misfortune until lady Philosophy arrives, sends his muses away, who she claims have been doing more harm than not. It’s is interesting how the poems seem to be a mix of a dialogue and description to which the prose itself responds. For example, in Chapter 2 Philosophy, in the poem, describes Boethius as “Now prostrate, mental vision dulled…” and in the prose she claims that it is because “He is suffering from low energy, a condition common to duped minds.”
Although I would say that the general pattern of the books is to introduce an idea that is then expounded on in the prose that follows, it is not exactly like that. For example, the prose of Chapter 5 is expounded on by the poem of Chapter 6. Philosophy tells him that he resents Fortune for his imprisonment, and then in the poem she explains that the gods have their reasons for having things happen the way they do. It is to obtain a specific outcome.
I would say that the Books would flow even if they were not divided into different chapters. I assume that this was done for stylistic purposes rather than narrative purposes.

Michael Pruess said

at 9:24 am on Feb 12, 2010

To my shame, I put off doing this assignment until this morning -- and only just now discovered that I am not in possession of the Boethius. The Cal store must have flubbed my order, it's just not in the bag. I'll try to pick up a copy after class. Apologies to all.

Ana Corral said

at 10:55 am on Feb 12, 2010

I totally agree with Stacy, I feel like Book I is all about Boethius' pity party; for a great majority of this book all he does is complain about how fate has caused his imprisonment and how all he ever wanted was justice and an end to the corruption. Chapter seven ends with a poem, that I feel is distinct than the other poems in this book. The overall feeling of the poem I felt was a little more resigned but in a good way. It seems like in this poem he has somewhat become more accepting of his imprisonment, and that he just needs to have faith in his own innocence and philosophy and that he will be okay in the end. “Forgo empty joys, Dismiss every fear, Renounce idle hope, Let grief come not near.” (Boethius, pg. 18). This really reminded me of Socrates and how he was so confident before his death that since he was a philosopher and he believed in the immortality of the souls, he would go to a better place after his death. I sort of feel like Boethius is trying to convince himself, the same way that Socrates was that since he studied philosophy and the ‘truth’ he shouldn’t fear death.

Chris said

at 11:24 am on Feb 12, 2010

The opening chapter of Boethius’ “The Consolation of Philosophy” renders a scene of Boethius being visited by “Philosophy” after having finished his first poem of “somber days.” Boethius recognizes that the muses who have inspired his “zest” to “[pen] songs in happier days” still “attend [him] on the path [he] treads” (3). The importance of the muses having not left Boethius becomes apparent when “Philosophy” appears to him in the form of a woman. The suggestion being that while the muses are capable of aiding Boethius in the face of death, that somehow “Philosophy” had abandoned him. Her reappearing to Boethius begins a process through which he will come to recognize that Philosophy is the best aid in facing death. Philosophy is furious with the impact the muses have had upon Boethius and “her eyes lit on the Muses of poetry,” asking, “Who has allowed these harlots of the stage to approach this sick man? Not only do they afford no remedies to relieve his pains, but their succulent poisons intensify them” (4). It is important to note that Philosophy does not simply dismiss the Muses, but recognizes their ability to intensify the pains of Boethius. Her argument that the Muses offer to “remedies to relive his pains” implies that Philosophy is capable of providing a remedy. In recognizing the arguments of Philosophy, Boethius is “struck dumb” (4).

Chris said

at 11:25 am on Feb 12, 2010

(continued) The imagery within the poem that begins the second chapter renders an image of Philosophy as nurturing. The image presents the wind, a harvest, a stream, and fruit. The implication of these images is then reinforced in the prose when philosophy suggests that it is a time for “healing.” “Philosophy” takes on a maternal image when suggesting that Boethius had been “nurtured with [her] milk” and “reared on [her] solid food until [his] mind attained full maturity” (5-6). She refers to this process immediately after as having prepared Boethius for death stating “that armour which I then bestowed on you should have afforded you invincible strength if you had not cast it off earlier” (6). Philosophy’s ability to oscillate between nurturer and armorer suggests that it is able to provide quite the remedy in the face of death. It is soft when Boethius needs it to be and strong when he needs something to stand upon. After having been visited by “Philosophy,” Boethius is able to return to his rationality in the later chapters and discuss how exactly he has come to be in this position. His poetry remains, but the prose takes on a rationality that seems to remedy his “tears unfeigned.”

Karena Ajamian said

at 8:32 pm on Feb 14, 2010

In Chapter 1 of the Boethius, I noticed several things having to do with Boethius’ productivity. It seems that though the Muses arouse distresses in Boethius’ life, they hardly leave him high and dry. Instead, the Muses give him something to verse about. In the first poem, Boethius claims that, before (in happier days), he used to be able to create songs. Now, he has no choice (or “must”) do the same on a somber note (3). A Muse -- an inspirator -- gives him the need to create (e.g. this very poem). He feeds off his own angst, in which “sad verses flood [his] cheeks” (3). The Muses, then, are able to inspire this overflow of thoughts, or “verses,” so that the Muses are the juices to his flow. As Boethius says so himself, though “blood-stained” the Muses “inspire” him (3). In this way, the chaos in his life leads him to artistic creations. The conflicting language (in one sentence, “entice” and “destruction”) suggests that he wants two conflicting things at once (to be rid of this pain, but to be able to produce) (4). The happier days no longer cut it, where he must seek this sad though novel way of penning with zest.

Boethius says it best when he claims that the Muses help him “articulate [his] grief” (4). In the prose portion of Chapter 1, Philosophy also admits, “Not only do [the Muses] afford no remedies to relieve his pains, but their succulent poisons intensify them” (4). Being as it may, these negative Muses still, productive as they are, help hurry those symptoms along. That is, the Muses -- inspirators -- aren’t worthless as a cause, giving Boethius the juice to produce the very poem he writes to tell us about them.

Sara Sol said

at 10:52 pm on Feb 15, 2010

Soul and Body:
There is a consistency in Boethius' descriptions of soul/body in the text although he does not state explicitly what their connection is - he repeatedly likens the soul to the heavens and the good, and the body to earth and weight and the false good/bad. In the end of the verse of chap 10 Boethius states that material/physical pleasures are "nourished by the earth in caverns deep", and in chap 11 says "earth is forced downwards by its weight", the weight of the earth which "weighs men down" is likened to the body in chap 11 verse " the body's weight imparts forgetfulness"- the body is impeding to the soul and the mind, because it is heavy and thus allows the weight of earth to drag it down, these images all recall Plato's "sluggishness" of the body and of the soul weighed down by the body. Juxtaposed with these images are those of freedom and lightness of the soul: "the soul turns round the heavens, which mirror in this way its very self." - the soul is a reflection of the floating heavenly bodies.

Sara Sol said

at 10:53 pm on Feb 15, 2010

(cont) Boethius makes a third distinct being, in addition to soul and body: mind. this addition confuses the already confused relationship between soul and body: "the soul which stirs all things You intertwine/in threefold nature as its middle part.../the soul,thus split, then concentrates its course within two orbits as it journeys back upon itself, encircling the mind/that lies deep down. "(56) This description is extremely convoluted, but seems to describe the connection between soul and mind and implies a connection to body in the "threefold nature" - soul is the medium ( the "middle part") between mind and the body. Later in the text the differentiation between soul and mind seems to be only that mind is that which is duped by the body, and the soul is what suffers the consequences: " the pleasure that men's mind are roused to love...sees nothing of the soul's dark fall so steep"(61). i don't know if this switch between the word " soul" and "mind" was intentional or if it was a translators decision, but it ads another dimension to the souls function- it doesn't control the body or the mind but suffers from both. But when the distinction between mind and soul is made, what is the soul if not the consciousness? Boethius is very unclear about this, although he is very clear in his restatement of Plato's thoughts on goodness and revocation of bodily pleasures/wants and materialism- all associated strongly with the body. He says over and over again that the physical means of achieving good only bring one to false good, calling back to Plato's condemnation of physical senses- again illustrating the soul as the pathway away from these mortal/earthly goods and towards the ultimate good/divinity/heaven.

Sara Sol said

at 10:53 pm on Feb 15, 2010

(cont)My biggest question about his soul/body theory is contained in this statement: "when soul and body unite and continue to exist, men call this a living being; but when its unity is dissolved by the separation of the two, it clearly dies"(62) - e here the soul is only in existence (literally a in a state of living) when conjoined with the body- if this is so than its escape from the body can only come about in exploring within the mind, i.e. "self- knowledge". But does this mean that there is no eventual return to the original good and the true unity and the divinity- if this is possible than what does the existence of that "good" even mean when it is absolutely untouchable? Does it mean that at death the souls existence is blotted out with the bodies? I like this idea of existence through unity and good/divine through unity but the are holes in the explanation Boethius gives .

jenneke_olson@berkeley.edu said

at 5:03 pm on Feb 16, 2010

Soul/Body:
When we wrote about souls, the thing I noticed above all else was that everyone has a different view of what it could be. As I read Boethius, the thing I noted to myself was that the common theme of happiness is similarly something that is entirely up to one’s own opinion of what it is (it is even discussed in book 3). At one point, it is said that “the blessings you enjoy, even now, are dearer that life itself (page 26)”. The worth of a blessing, which could be construed as happiness, is being compared to the worth of a life. I could not help but compare the concept of souls to the concept of happiness as I continued reading. As Lady Philosophy proved, the various ways in which mortals seek happiness could not lead to ultimate happiness. As a result of that, I related physical happiness to the mortal body, and ultimate happiness to the immortal body (the soul). It made me think that what was being described was a sort of tandem co-inhabitance within our bodies, seeking physical happiness and true happiness.
Additionally, in book 3, one of the rationalities used in proving the existence of a true good or true happiness is that it is widely acknowledged that God, since there is no better being, is in possession of true happiness. It is then proved that the origin, as God, allows a nature of goodness to be in every living creature. It is also mentioned that if every person has an innate amount of good in them, they have a God-like potential or worth to them. It made me think of Plato’s theory of immortal souls and how they all came from the same source. Except in the Boethius version, it’s not so much about the immortality of souls, as it is about what the existence of a soul implies in terms of the human life and its’ happiness.

Karena Ajamian said

at 12:16 am on Feb 17, 2010

For the bulk of Book 2, Lady Philosophy very implicitly addresses some of the main points we discussed with regards to the body/soul distinction. Over the course of my reading, though, I recognized that the text accumulates issues rounding out to a much more explicit argument on the subject of immortality. To begin, Lady Philosophy makes frequent references to the insignificance of fleeting experiences, and reiterates such criticisms throughout. The first line that summoned my attention was Lady Philosophy’s critique, “Surely you do not believe that purely ephemeral happiness is of value?” (20) Within this simple question is a whole bevy of critiques which, quite presumptuously, attacks sensual pleasures, as they are fleeting. She maintains a critique with respect to time, continually using words such as “ephemeral,” “fleeting,” “transient,” “finite,” “momentary” as opposed to “perennial,” “permanence,” “eternal,” “infinite,” and “preserve.” More significantly, Lady Philosophy frames a capitalistic discussion as she frequently returns to the meaning, and significance, of possession. “Fear of losing” possessions, for example, is a recurring issue which implicitly challenges the significance of material merit. A will towards superficial wants, then, is criticized as trivial for its inability to actually last beyond the death of the body.

Karena Ajamian said

at 12:16 am on Feb 17, 2010

Once Lady Philosophy reaches an explicit discussion about the death of the body, the discussion more directly addresses the issues implicated in the body/soul distinction. On glory-hoarders, she asks, “What concern have they with reputation once their bodies have relaxed in death?” (36) In other words, what is “reputation” to death? How does reputation stand towards death, if, according to Lady Philosophy, reputation cannot possibly survive beyond a finite length of time? In fooling themselves to “cheat mortality,” they are fooling themselves to believe a false happiness. Bodily pleasures, ephemeral as they are, give us nothing of value, since “mortal and transient things” could not possibly endow us with true happiness (55).

Stacy said

at 7:55 am on Feb 17, 2010

Lady Philosophy and Fortune are both mother figures in Boethius’ life but I feel that Fortune is more of a provider and Lady Philosophy is more of a nurturer. While Fortune provided Boethius with wealth and a good position, Lady Philosophy leads him to the knowledge of what is true happiness. Through Book II and part of Book III, we see Lady Philosophy chastising Boethius for being ungrateful but she attributes it to the befuddled state of mind in which he finds himself. He has been blessed by Fortune for having all the wealth she bestowed on him and he has no right to complain about. As is stated, Fortune has the right to take away anything she has given him because it is her right. I can’t help but draw a parallel between Lady Philosophy, Fortune, and Boethius and a nuclear family. Honestly, I see Lady Philosophy as the mother, Fortune as the father, and Boethius as the son.
Then Lady Philosophy goes on to refute the false happiness of possessions, status, and fame. I find it interesting how after she refutes this false happiness in previous chapters, she goes on to make the statement in chapter 11 that the soul and the body together make a living being and when they separate, there is no longer a living being because it dies. Then she states that a body that is still intact is still a body and if its parts are scattered then it is no longer a body but then she doesn’t really explain what happens to the soul. I honestly thought that she was somehow going to relate the false happiness with how it affects the soul.

Mazzin said

at 10:54 am on Feb 17, 2010

In the Book II Lady philosophy speaks Fortune’s argument. Fortune’s argument re-enforces the Socratic view of bodily distractions. Everything that Boethius is grieving over has been dispelled as unimportant. Boethius claims that his fortunes were taken away, when in fact Fortune proves to him that they were never actually his. Fortune goes on to denounce all common forms of fake fortune; riches, high office, food, women, body pleasures. These are all pleasures of the body, not of the soul. The soul does not yearn for any fake fortunes. Fake fortunes are those that lie outside of the body. In Book II chapter 4 verse 22, Philosophy writes, “so why mortal men, do you pursue happiness outside yourselves, when it lies within you? She is pointing out that anything, which pleasures the body, is outside of the soul, and, if it is outside of the soul it is not true happiness. Happiness can only be achieved by striving for the divine, and there is a clear difference between the divine and the body. In book II chapter 10 verse 11, Lady philosophy talks about the distinction between the soul and the body much more directly. “Take the case of living creatures, When soul and body unite and continue to exist, men cal this a living being.” Lady Philosophy again re-enforces the Socratic ideas. She is speaking about the death of the body and the prevailing of the soul. In the same chapter verse 30, LP gives an analogy linking the soul and the body. “here we are not discussing voluntary movements of the conscious soul, but the thrust of nature; unthinking digestion of foods, or unconscious breathing in sleep.” This point however, serves not to distinguish between soul and body but between soul and nature.

KJA said

at 11:23 pm on Nov 20, 2010

"...your mind's abode; for I have installed there not books, but what gives books their value..."
"But human acts you do not school..."

The Consolation of Philosophy is a book that begins itself by way of interruption. It opens with a poem from another book- a hypothetical book: a collection of poems that mingle accounts of Boethius' biography with personal lamentations survives in only one fragment- that one poem which as I have said opens the Consolation. This potential book of prison poems echoes Socrates' own potential book of poetry mentioned in the Apology. Both books are 'quoted' within their respective narratives and the meaning of this gesture of throwing off the one poetic project for the other finished work that we now read is what I would briefly like to interpret.--

KJA said

at 11:23 pm on Nov 20, 2010

Basically, I think what Lady Philosophy is signalling in the quote above and with regard to any work or labor undertaken is that value- and all value worth its salt is value which leads to the realization of the Good which is God and adheres to the unchanging law holding that all things that come into being change- does not inhere in names or titles or forms, lower-case forms such as books or worldly renown. This is a running theme, value is a measure of the distance between oneself and God, thinker-into-being of all forms. What gives books their value isn't the words on the page, or the pretty pictures they conjure- it is what transcends the book- wisdom -the path to the one true Good God. All value is pedagogic by nature. All else is vanity. Everything on earth, in Plato's cave, under the sun is subordinated to a higher order of design inevitable as death. Problem is, unlike plants and climatic phenomena, human acts are not schooled dot-dot-dot except by an inward turn to contemplation of the Father and his Forms which we have access to through Nature's works and pedagogic works in the Platonic vain- works that *claim* to be bereft of all that overwrought bungle of verbiage whose names include mimesis, poeisis, and lyric. They all have their place in God's order and this place, whether it is near or far, inevitably leads to God** but it is the dialectic-pedagogic bungle that is clearly favored.

KJA said

at 11:25 pm on Nov 20, 2010

So much for BKs I-III, but what about that gesture of throwing off the poetic work for the philosophic work? Well, books have a way of being transmitted over time and as Lady Philosophy knows given different names at different times, historically contingent hierarchies which are moveable and arranged under God, and these once books of poetry become novels become Finnegans Wake become lyric become become become but whatever becomes on this earth is an electrode-potato, a rampart in LP's metaphor measuring by means of human acts guided by wisdom learned in *these* books and works to judge rightly their relations, their trajectories good or bad false or true through animacy and inanimacy to Form of Forms. But wait, this all reminds me- what does Boethius have to say for memory? For remembering? And what about in relation to recollection?..... anyone want to add anything? (Just kidding, I hope I'm alone on this)




**(Definition of God as given in BK I of the Consolation: "Whatever causes created things to remain in being and in motion I call God, the conventional term which all men use." Again note the deployment of the concept of motion tying Boethius in with the presocratics minus Parmenides/Zeno)

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