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Week 6 - Boethius (V) and Calvino

Page history last edited by Karena Ajamian 14 years, 2 months ago

**NOTE: CLICK ON "EDIT" TO ENTER YOUR TEXT ON THE PAGE"

 

Assignment for WED, 2/24:

 

Calvino, "At Daybreak", "How Much Shall We Bet?"

Boethius, CONSOLATION OF PHILOSOPHY, Books IV-V

 

Write at least two paragraphs viewing a story of Calvino through the lens of B's Neo-Platonic theory. You may choose to do a close reading of a specific passage or to give a thematic overview. Some aspects Boethius raises which you might want to consider are: Fate vs. Providence; Change and Metamorphosis; the relation of the temporal to the eternal/present; narrative vantage-points (p.90, for instance); shifting perspectives of plot and story structure; hierarchies of knowledge; the relationship of Mind to motion and change; the exercise of freedom; the problem of foreknowledge and necessity; simplicity and complexity; the formation of the future; sensation/imagination/reason/understanding; presence; 

 

or consider in terms of the following quotes from THE CONSOLATION:

 

"Comparison can be made to the craftsman who first envisages in his mind the shape of the object which he is to create. He sets to work on it, and stage by stage he produces what he had earlier visualized as a unity, and at a single moment. In the same way, God by Providence orders what is to be done in a unified and unchanging manner, but by Fate he carries through these arrangements in a manifold way within the bounds of time." (Bk. 4, Ch.5, p.88)

 

"The mind, enveloped in the cloud of mortal limbs,

Does not, however, lose all memory of itself;

It grasps the whole while failing to retain the parts." (Bk.5, Ch.3, p.103)

 

"If previous knowledge in fact implants no necessity on future events--and you yourself also conceded this a moment ago--why should results of acts of the will be restricted to one particular knowledge?" (Bk.5, Ch.4, p.104)

 

"[A]ll that is known is known not through its own nature but through the nature of those who apprehend it." (Bk.5, Ch.6, p.110)

 

"God must not be visualized as prior to the created world merely in length of time; rather, it is by virtue of possession of his simple nature. This condition of his, unchanging life in the present, is imitated by the perpetual movement of temporal things. Since that movement is unable to achieve and to match that unchanging life, it degenerates from changelessness into change." (Bk.5, Ch.6, p.111)

 

*     *     *

Jack: What do you consider a "degeneration"?

 

“That movement [of temporal things] degenerates from changelessness to change” (Boethius, 111).

 

“…as space was then…containing no destination or meaning. And I think how beautiful it was then…” (Calvino, 92). 

 

Changes, temporal series, Boethius tells us, are merely weak imitations of an eternal present. Each instant has a fleeting appearance of present-ness, but God’s present is the real, enduring, deeper present. It is because of his unchanging state that God is able to see all of past and future history as part of one whole. It is because of man’s changing state, his unbreakable connection to mere sequences of events, that he cannot. 

 

            This is fundamentally different from Calvino’s version of seeing the future. Qfwfq originally can calculate the future perfectly, precisely as a series of events with a known starting point. When humans come along though, he can no longer predict their actions. This is in pretty obvious opposition to the “foreknowledge does not conflict with free will” party championed by Lady Philosophy. (Although the Dean’s successes do present an interesting perspective on God figures. I think Sara is kind of right (in her comment below) to liken him to God, but I would go further and make an explicit judgment that he is a parody of God-stasis, a loser compared to the brilliantly inventive and charismatic Qfwfw. (Maybe Sara was saying this, sorry I’m in a bit of a rush.) I think the case of the Dean doesn’t exist in perfect synchronicity with Qfwfw’s prediction attempts in terms of the possibility of predicting the future, but is rather present in order to make a statement about the kind of character one would be if it were possible. End long digression.)

 

            Actually, my digression was pointing pretty clearly to my main contention here: Calvino believes (or chooses to believe, or imaginatively decides) that human actions are not perfectly predictable because he prefers human changeability to a “divine” stasis. It is largely an aesthetic choice, as are many of Calvino’s stories. That’s the conclusion I have now come to instinctively go to with these stories, let’s see if it holds up:

 

Objection number 1 of a pious whining logician prisoner: “Wait, didn’t you just say that the two methods of telling the future are fundamentally different? If Qfwfq tells the future by viewing a series of events, and then this is made impossible by human free will, isn’t this just a repudiation of the human, rational view of the world and not of the divine, eternal-present view?”

 

Answer: Divine, eternal-present view is nonsense. If you were like that you would be a wheelchair-bound paralytic covered in newspapers. Therefore, you aren’t very impressive, your viewpoint isn’t very divine, and frankly there is no reason to imagine such a figure if he isn’t going to fulfill Socrates’ wish for things to be “for the best.” 

 

Objection Duo: Wait, doesn’t Qfwfq say it was really nice back then? He liked playing God…

 

Answer: No, he liked playing the human. As said above, he predicted based on reason, based on causal chains, he wasn’t God and he still isn’t. He still has the capability of reason; his reason is accurate as far as it goes. But where it doesn’t go is human free will. And yes there was a kind of beauty then, and now we live in a “doughy” world. The pre-color world was beautiful in its way too, but it lacked a vital human element. And before humans, it was a world “containing no destination or meaning” (92). Humans are necessary for meaning, and they are necessary for the appreciation of beauty. The Dean doesn’t appreciate beauty. Qfwfq turns out to be the greatest celebrant of the pre-color world (come on, Ayl can’t really celebrate, she’s just something else to be celebrated). The end of the story is a moment of temporary nostalgia, but one should remember that such moments are only possible by a guy like Qfwfq. He momentarily (and, incidentally, moments are beautiful things) is sad for the reduced role of rational connect the dots, but his predictions were always, as Sara very usefully points out, part imagination and part rationality. A static God who sees all is incapable of imagining new things; this lack of imagination makes betting with him no fun at all.

 

Hmm, much more than I meant to write.  

 

 

 

Karena

 

We learned from Lady Philosophy that knowing what is going to happen before it occurs does not necessarily cause that event to occur.  She asserts, “Thus these events, even if foreknown, have an outcome free of necessity, for just as knowledge of present events imposes no necessity on them as they occur, so foreknowledge of future events imposes no necessity on things still to come” (Boethius, 105).  An event does not occur on account of the foreknowledge (“I know it will happen, and that’s why it will happen”).  Instead, that event occurs, and the foreknowledge just happens to exist.

 

After making such an argument, it seems Lady Philosophy ventures to suggest that an event will occur with or without God’s foreknowledge of it.  That is, if the one thing does not cause the other (if in fact it does not matter that God knows an event is going to happen in order for that event to occur), then these two facts (the foreknowledge of an event, and the event itself) should operate independently from one another.

 

A short passage from Calvino’s story, “How Much Shall We Bet?,” certainly concedes a similar point.  In fact, it seems that Qfwfq’s condition as described by Calvino even emphasizes the independence of these facts (again, the foreknowledge of an event, and the event itself) because of its form as a bet.  This is foregrounded in passages in which Qfwfq is described to have improved his ability to predict what will occur.  “Conversely, the more I went ahead, the better I understood the mechanism, and in the face of every new phenomenon, after a few rather groping bets, I could calculate my previsions rationally” (Calvino, 88).  Sometimes Qfwfq is right, and sometimes he is wrong.  What remains true is the occurrence of an event, which does not necessarily occur by virtue of Qfwfq's prediction.  While God, of course, would never make any mistakes, Qfwfq’s improving estimation reminds us, or at least helps us to imagine, a condition in which an event is predicted and occurs -- in which the foreknowledge and the event are independent from one another.

 

God’s knowledge, however, is quite different and more complicated than that.  “It abides in the simplicity of its present, embraces the boundless extent of past and future, and by virtue of its simple comprehension, it ponders all things as if they were being enacted in the present” (Boethius, 112).  God knows all because he is eternal, and already conceives of all the past, present, and future in one moment.  Though Lady Philosophy’s God is in this divine state of knowing and experiencing events, I detect undercurrents of that conceivability in Calvino’s story in describing Qfwfq’s effort to retain all that he already knows.  “I got much more satisfaction, however, from the bets we had to bear in mind for billions and billions of years, without forgetting what we had bet on, and remembering the shorter-term bets at the same time . . .” (Calvino, 89).  Here, Qfwfq tries to encompass all of the knowledge in his mind all at once in order to continue making accurate bets.  Though Calvino’s version does not assign Qfwfq the ability to know everything “in a moment,” it seems that he does assign Qfwfq with the greatest capacity to know as humanly possible.

 

My question at this point would be, who for Lady Philosophy is Qfwfq?  What is his status relative to humans and the divine Providence, God?  Where do Qfwfq's capabilities leave him on her scale?

 

On a side note, I also noticed a Descartes influence in this passage, where Qfwfq says, “We were always betting, the Dean and I, because there was really nothing else to do, and also because the only proof I existed was that I bet with him, and the only proof he existed was that he bet with me” [my emphasis] (Calvino, 86).  This condition sounds strikingly similar to Descartes’ “I think, therefore I am,” where the “betting” replaces the thinking in determining the proof of our existence.  In fact, recognizing that substitution aligns this closer to the Consolation, since Lady Philosophy refers to God’s knowledge rather than God’s gambling.

 

Another point of difference between the two thoughts (Descartes, Calvino) is that Calvino’s story adds on:  Qfwfq also implies a relationship with another being (“I bet with him”), in which the one depends on the other.

Comments (20)

jenneke_olson@berkeley.edu said

at 5:41 pm on Feb 23, 2010

“God’s gaze anticipates everything that is to happen, and draws it back and recalls it to his own knowing in the present. There is no vacillation such as you imagine, with his foreknowledge changing this way and that; rather, with a single glance it anticipates and embraces the changes which you make, while itself remaining unchanged. God derives this understanding and vision in the present not from the outcome of future events, but from his own simplicity.” (page 114)

In “How Much Shall We Bet”, I read about Qfwfq calculating his predictions and couldn’t help but liken him to a God-like figure for being able to predict so far into the future without even the use of math. He was able to simply know something would happen without influencing events in any way. The reason I say this is because what I deduced from Boethius’ writing (particularly the quote I began with) is that his version of God just simply knows everything that will happen, period, without influencing anything he himself “remaining unchanged”.

jenneke_olson@berkeley.edu said

at 5:41 pm on Feb 23, 2010

It made me feel sorry for that type of a God, having to know anything and everything without having any kind of control over it. I didn’t think about this until I read “How Much”. Qfwfq just gets so caught up in the fact that it will happen, it’s going to happen, that he starts to look so much into the future and disregards the present (unless of course to check that he was right). Eventually he becomes reminiscent of the time when he knew nothing: “I think how beautiful it was then, through that void, to draw lines and parabolas, pick out the precise point, the intersection between space and time…whereas now events come flowing down without interruption…separated by black and incongruous headlines, a doughy mass of events without form or direction, which surrounds, submerges crushes all reasoning.” This gave me a further understanding of Boethius’ suggestion that though God doesn’t necessarily punish “evil” individuals he knows that they eventually get what’s coming to them.

Sara Sol said

at 9:17 pm on Feb 23, 2010

For some reason it wont let me edit so i will just post 5 million comments:

boethius and calvino
In How much shall we bet? Calvino asks a question that reveals the absence of a comprehensible answer: Does the event occur because of its prediction or does the prediction come about because the event will occur?
At “the birth of all things” definition does not exist, neither in words or being, for not even being is definite, and it can only be defined by its act of defining: “the only proof I existed was that I bet with him”( pg 86)- space was uniformly empty except these two conscious beings.
“the birth of all things , the entire development of nature’s subject to change, and all that is in any way stirred to motion, derives their causes and order and shapes from the unchanging steadfastness of the divine mind” (Boethius 87)

Sara Sol said

at 9:19 pm on Feb 23, 2010

When Qfwfq predicts the future with a word that is yet to be defined like “universe”, the word inevitably takes on the definition of whatever occurs, Qfwfq’s ability to imagine allows him to create this cohesion between a definition and a word. Regardless of what actually occurs, the future is bound to be what as he predicts it simply because in this story “existence” relies on definition, and when the future occurs he is the only being capable of defining, or naming it so it presumably goes by the name he chooses. The accuracy of his predictions relies on the fact that 1) he has neamed it and 2) he predicts a change.

Sara Sol said

at 9:19 pm on Feb 23, 2010

Qfwfqs ability to calculate the early universe rationally relies entirely on the fact that there is no one else to imagine how to name things, so whatever occurs is what he called it- he projects his truths onto the world and thus gains knowledge: ”In the acquisition of knowledge all these elements deploy their own powers rather than those of the objects perceived” (Boethius 107) The Dean fails because “when a word began to have one meaning, he could not conceive of its having any other” – he lacks imagination of differentiation, unlike Qfwfq. The Dean always loses his predictions because “he had a static sense of reality”(Calvino 87), and Qfwfq has the advantage only because he assumes change rather than static-state: this is the first metamorphosis – the departure from simple “sensation” in static beings like the mollusk and the Dean, to a being with imagination, namely, Qfwfq .

Sara Sol said

at 9:20 pm on Feb 23, 2010

In this beginning space was so empty and time so negligible that one event alone would occur at a time and there was no room for “chance” because it is the “unexpected outcome of a conjunction of causes” (Boethius 98). When there is only one occurrence there can’t be a conjunction, and there cannot be a chance. As Qfwfq’s universe gains momentum events begin to occur at the same time and begin to effect each other, giving birth to the concept of “chance” – here Qfwfq goes through a second metamorphosis – from a being of imagination to one of reason, i.e he begins to find connections between the causal occurrences rather than perceiving them as disconnected and distinct, and begins to “predict” what is to occur. Just as imagination served him better than sensation, rationality opens up a whole new set of possible calculations and again he is able to pass the Dean, who is still the static being he was in the beginning: “The more I went ahead, the better I understood the mechanism, and in the face of every new phenomenon, after a few rather groping bets, I could calculate my previsions rationally”(Calvino, 88)

Sara Sol said

at 9:20 pm on Feb 23, 2010

But as he predicts, humans are born, and suddenly the whole things becomes more and more complex because the world is not subject to solely his interpretation, there are other beings deciding definitions of things and there is so much of this that there are suddenly infinitely many conjunctions of casual occurrences- chance becomes the rule of the universe. He is unable to predict and follow all of these paths because so many different chains are intersecting and making new things happen- reason fails because it attempts to continue making distinctions between things, and cannot take look at the whole. He was king of predicting the universe in which he could “draw lines and parabolas, pick out the precise point, the intersection between space and time where the event would spring forth, undeniable in the prominence of its glow” – where imagination could define and reason distinguishes. But in the newer universe filled with endless “chance”, or possibility, this method fails him. In the newer universe “events come flowing down without interruption, like cement being poured, one column next to another, one within the other, separated by black incongruous headlines, legible in other ways but intrinsically illegible, a doughy mass of events without form or direction, which surrounds, submerges, crushes all reason.”(Calvino 93) Qfwfq continues to use reason, which can only make distinctions but cannot step outside of the “present” overwhelming moment and see the whole eternal moment where the idea of chance is nonexistent. Its as if reason has lead him to lose the forest for the trees.

Sara Sol said

at 9:20 pm on Feb 23, 2010

Here, finally, the Dean has an advantage because in being an eternally static being he is closer to the method of divine understanding which stirs to motion while maintaining its ever static state of changeless unity. The Dean, like Boethius’s God, is not caught in the rush of this doughy mass of events. Although he is the lowest being, the hierarchy of Knowledge acquires a circular quality, starting at the static sensations and ending at something close in nature to both the static and the distinguishing movement: the constantly impelling, moving and yet eternally static understanding which embraces everything in a unity and does not make distinctions like time or space and simultaneously retains the ability to recognize them within the unity: “the simplicity of highest being confined by no bounds”- neither the bounds of distinction nor the bounds of staticism, and this is the state into which Qfwfq does not manage a metamorphosis, because his story wasn’t written that way.

Sara Sol said

at 9:21 pm on Feb 23, 2010

Sorry it was so long, I got really excited and then realized how confusing my ideas were once I started writing.

Sara Sol said

at 12:21 am on Feb 24, 2010

jack: I did not at all notice the parody of boethiu's world in calvino's when i was writing, but as i read yours i realized i'd missed such a strong underpinning of the stor. Humans= interesting because they are complex and silly and often wrong, similarly to what jenneke said its as if Calvino has us feel sorry/be annoyed with the god figure. It reminds me of Milton's covert expression of the absolute boring-to-death nature of "heaven"- his descision to have as his main character not the protagonist, but the most vile antagonist- none other than satan, simply because he is loads and loads more interesting. The only book in Paradise Lost that is set in heaven is boring as hell (no pun intended) . Anyway, i definately see this playing out in the Calvino stories- "humans" ,or rather, anthropomorphic beings, have a irreplacable quality in all the stories.

Jack Gedney said

at 12:43 am on Feb 24, 2010

I like the comparison to Milton, although I think there are lots of arguments that claim that Milton wasn't actually advocating Satan as Calvino does Qfwfq. One of the chief ones is that we are fallen human beings and so it is because of our flawed postlapsarian nature that we sympathize with Satan. While a big part of Satan's appeal is in his grand, defiant speeches and heroic rhetoric (grandiosity isn't a foreign quality to Qfwfq), I think you are also right to put the emphasis on the complex and silly and wrong. Wrong because Calvino is pretty clear that the stories are inventions and not doctrine; silliness is perhaps only one aspect, but definitely part of his homely metaphors of noodles and gambling, etc.

So, just to expand on your suggested comparison, Calvino emulates the grandeur of Milton's Satan, but, in taking away militaristic pretensions from the equation, allows an acceptance and indeed embracing of the flawed, "fallen" humanity. I could put "flawed" in quotes too.

Mazzin said

at 2:06 am on Feb 24, 2010

Well you guys are saying all there is to say, I dont wont to repeat stuff so let me try to add anything that may be useful. On one level I saw a similarity between the character of Mr. Dean and the Boethius character. The Mr. Dean character is always questioning the validity of Q's bets. Dean doesn't supply the real answer simply questions. I sort of got the impression Calvino is comparing this to Boethius's methods. Boethius keeps questioning LP's views on foreknowledge and providence but doesn't offer any answers himself. I know the basis for the Dean not knowing any alternative was the whole concept of lack of imagination as Sara talked about. I don't know, this comparison came into my head but it may be completely off.

Mazzin said

at 2:09 am on Feb 24, 2010

In "How much shall we bet?" I believe Calvino comments on Boethius's criticism o God's foreknowledge. ""How much?.. I tried to lead our predictions into the field of numbers....."They'll grow e raised to pi"....Trying to act smartI Any fool could have told that much." this quote deals with how Boethius believed God cant couldn't have foreknowledge if he wasn't completely certain the outcome was going to happen. "So if something is about to happen in such a way that its outcome is not certain and necessary, how can it possible be foreknown that it will occur? " Its kind of like saying, he thinks he is so smart but anybody can predict something as an opinion, it may or may not happen.

Mazzin said

at 2:10 am on Feb 24, 2010

Another major Boethius idea Calvino brings is the idea of Providence vs. Fate. Q starts losing bets because he doesn't understand the concept of providence and fate, and therefore doesn't understand the concept of free will. (pg.88, bottom) "And so, from the data I had at my disposal, I tried mentally to deduce other data, and from them still others, until I succeeded in predicting eventualities that had no apparent connection with what we were arguing about" (pg. 89 top) "I admit it required very complicated deductions to forsee the Mesopotamian plans black with...." Q is basically playing the role of God but using judgment of a human. His role of god is to initiate Providence, he can creat and predict the overall "eventual" outcome of something. This outcome is reached in many different ways through free will. Q is thinking like a human would in tracing step by step all the millions of variables which effect each other to get to the final prediction.

Mazzin said

at 2:10 am on Feb 24, 2010

There is a sort of butterfly effect that goes on. The eventual outcome is predicted but the path to it is unknown. This becomes a much bigger problem for Q as the universe starts to develop. The development adds much more variables, as these variables are added the butterfly effect gets more and more complicated and Q has to trace many many things, this is why he makes mistakes. When the humans come with there free will the course of fate gets way too complicated and Q loses more and more. Q's acknowledgment at his attempt to follow this butterfly effect is stated in this quote. "...But my passion for gambling led me, from every possible event, to foresee the interminable series of events that followed, even down to the most marginal and aleatory ones. This also brings in the concept of accident and chance. Here Q admits chace, quite contrary to LP's view o chance.There is a point where Q realizes he's dug to deep into human free will and predicting the infinite amount of options were too difficult. This realization came in the form of sports. "Arsenal-Real Madrid, semifinal. Arsenal playing at home. Who wins? and in a moment I realized with what seemed a casual jumble of words I had hit on an infinite reserve of new combinations among the signs, which compact, opaque, uniform reality would use to disguise montony..."

Ana Corral said

at 9:02 am on Feb 24, 2010

After reading Calvino’s “At Daybreak”, I thought a lot about the role of Granny Bb’b in the story. “At Daybreak” is Qfwfq telling the story of how matter began to condense and how the beginning began. Throughout the entire story, Granny Bb’b keeps saying that she remembers when matter was “uniformly scattered in space, and there was heat and light” [pp. 19]. Qfwfq describes her as still believing that matter was uniform and that she was sure that things would go back to way they were before. He also talks about “getting through the long night” implying that there would be an end to the way they were living before, in only darkness. Granny Bb’b, I felt could be compared in a way to Boethius’ god. She had foreknowledge of what was going to happen, in actuality, I felt that she had a concept of what had happened and was going to happen as a whole. She seemed to know what had happened before the darkness, what would happen during the darkness and what would happen after it, in a way she seemed to know everything except for where her cushion was, although I found it strange that first of all if she was all-knowing, wouldn’t she know where her cushion was? And second of all, if she had been asking for her cushion for a really long time, wouldn’t she have cared more about it when Qfwfq found it?
After reading this story a couple of more times, I began to think that the cushion idea serves to purposes. First, it makes her [I guess I can say more human since I have no idea what ‘they’ are] and more relatable to the reader, as an old grandmother who always remembers the ‘good ole days’. Second, the fact that she was always asking for her cushion and then didn’t seem to care that it dissolved when brought out of nebula proves to me that she had already known where the cushion was and what would happen to it; she was just waiting for the cushion to be found, just like the god that Boethius describes.

Ana Corral said

at 9:02 am on Feb 24, 2010

One thing that LP said that really stood out to me and reminded me of Granny Bb’b was when LP was describing how Fate and Providence work. She says, “Imagine a series of concentric circles revolving round the same axis; the innermost one lies closest to the single nature of the central point, and itself acts as a sort of axis round which the other circles lying outside it can turn. The outermost circle travels round in a wider circle, and the further it departs from the undivided middle point, the more widespread is the area over which it extends…Similarly, whatever distances itself further from the highest Mind becomes enmeshed in the broacher chains of Fate…” [pp. 88]
This idea of a point or circle that is being circled by other circles reminded me of Granny Bb’b. When I picture how they were in the nebula, I picture everyone else just sort of hovering around her because of the fact that she is the oldest and seems to know everything that is. Granny Bb’b can be seen as a god/mind-like figure and the events that were occurring in this story as the ‘chains’ of fate.

Stacy said

at 9:19 am on Feb 24, 2010

In Calvino’s “How Much Shall We Bet?” we see how the Qfwfq and Dean start betting on whether or not certain events will happen. Initially I thought that Qfwfq won all the time because as he thought of an event such as the creation of the atom, it happened. It was like having the nous control the existence and shape of matter as well as motion. So through half of the story I thought that Dean (k)yK’s static sense of reality, which influenced his lack of imagination, was the reason he lost most of the time. Lady Philosophy states that “[S]ince God confines all things within due order, what place can be left for random processes?” I think this sort of the idea Dean (k)yK had about the universe. Things were a certain way, had been for millennia and so why would anything change now? That is why he bet against the possibility of any event happening. I’m still trying to figure out how Qfwfq begins to loose. His loosing is an indicator that the nous doesn’t control everything. Perhaps we need to bring in Aristotle’s philosophy of causality.

Stacy said

at 9:20 am on Feb 24, 2010

I also found two passages that could parallel each other, Qfwfq’s “I started feeling a bit strange, as if there was going to be a change of weather…”(k)yK and Lady philosophy’s “God’s gaze anticipates everything that is to happen, and draws it back and recalls it to his own knowing in the present.” I thought it was interesting that Qfwfq feels that a change is going to be happening soon and God knows of the change because he has glanced at it. I thought it was interesting. What I really want to get into is how Lady Philosophy attempts to put an all knowing God on the same plane with free will.She states: “There is free will for no rational nature could exist if it did not possess freedom of will.” She is trying to say that we have free will because otherwise we would be like robots ready to perform a preprogrammed sequence. However, how can you have both free will and an all knowing God? This is a line that she blurs because she cannot really explain it.

Michael Pruess said

at 11:22 am on Feb 24, 2010

In "At Daybreak" (and many other of Calvino's stories, including "A Sign in Space"), a lot of time goes by very slowly. It seems that as the amount of time approaches eternity, the experience of that time lengthens. In Book V of Boethius, true eternity is instant experience. Interesting, though technically as there is always change in Calvino's stories to mark the end of a period (thus limiting time from being eternity) there is no direct opposition. That said, it's interesting to think about what a long bout of nothing would look like to Boethius's omniscient God. Would it take up a larger portion of that "single moment"? Thinking about it is similar to thinking about "All at One Point." Some of the subjects in that story were larger or smaller than others, but can something be smaller than a geometric point? How can one or another take up more or less space? I suppose it's just fun to consider.

Another thing in "At Daybreak" that played off Philosophy's last teachings: things don't make any sense to the characters in the Calvino. This is like how humans can never attain God's knowledge. Something is happening, and the humans may or may not be playing a role in it, but maybe -someone- knows what's going on—but that knowledge can't be attained by reason.

Small note -- similarity to Orpheus, with Eurydice retreating underground; Qwfwq's sister disappears into the earth (also like Ayl in "Without Colors"), common theme in Calvino?

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